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Equity Market Timing is a relatively new capital structure theory taken by management to get 
sources of funds used by companies as corporate operational activities. This study examines and 
examines the effect of market timing equity as measured by using the (MTB) on capital structure as 
measured by using the book leverage ratio with the moderation of the board of directors structure. The 
sample used in this study was 80 companies. The data analysis method used is multiple regression. The 
results showed that MTB harmed capital structure. The moderating variable size of the board of 
commissioners and representatives of the board of directors weakens the negative impact of MTB on 
capital structure. An audit committee that did not measure the weaknesses or negative effects of MTB 
on capital structure. 
Efek Moderasi Struktur Dewan Direksi pada Hubungan Equity Market Timing—




Equity Market Timing merupakan teori struktur modal relatif baru yang digunakan oleh manajemen untuk 
mendapatkan sumber dana bagi perusahaan dalam kegiatan operasional perusahaan. Penelitian ini menguji 
dan menganalisis pengaruh equity market timing diukur dengan menggunakan Market To Book Ratio (MTB) 
terhadap struktur modal yang diukur dengan menggunakan book leverage ratio dengan moderasi struktur 
dewan direksi. Penelitian ini menggunakan sample sebanyak 80 Perusahaan. Metode analisis data yang 
digunakan adalah regresi berganda. Hasil penelitian menunjukan bahwa MTB berpengaruh negatif terhadap 
struktur modal. Variable moderasi ukuran dewan komisaris dan proporsi dewan direksi memperlemah 
pengaruh negatif dari MTB terhadap struktur modal. Ukuran komite audit tidak memperlemah atau 
memperkuat pengaruh negatif dari MTB terhadap struktur modal. 
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Managers must make a capital-structured decision 
that is very important to consider. Capital is an 
important element of companies to run their 
corporate operational activities and corporate 
investments. Besides that, a capital-structured 
decision also influences the corporate values in 
the future. Financial managers must determine 
the way to reach an optimum combination of the 
selected corporate financial resources to 
maximize the corporate share value (Aktas, Croci, 
& Petmezas, 2015).  
Bringham & Huston (2011) explain capital 
structured policy aims to gain source 
combinations that will minimize the capital cost. 
A relatively new capital structure theory is 
equity market timing (EMT), proposed by (Baker & 
Wurgler, 2002). It combines the corporate market 
value and the financial policy. Companies chase 
strategies of determining the equity market timing 
by issuing the stocks when the corporate value is 
high. Then, companies will sell the share when the 
corporate value is low. The reason is - when the 
corporate value is high, the equity borne by 
companies is lower and vice versa. Therefore, 
companies can obtain lower equity capital costs. 
(Baker & Wurgler, (2002) applied the MTB 
variable as the market value indicator influenced 
by capital structure. The term equity market timing 
is to use the temporal fluctuation of relative share 
value toward the other capital component values.  
Worthington & Higgs, (2005) found that 
Indonesia had a weak-form-inefficient market 
type.  This inefficient capital market situation 
encourages the equity market timing theory 
implementation in the capital structure. Many 
studies have investigated the influences of equity 
market timing on capital structures. Baker & 
Wurgler, (2002) found the negative and 
significant influence of MTB ratio toward the 
debt level changes. It meant higher MTB led to 
lower debt. It indicated a company followed the 
equity market timing theory. Zavertiaeva & 
Nechaeva, (2017), Mahajan & Tartaroglu, (2008), 
Huang & Ritter, (2005) and Chicti & Bougatef, 
(2010) confirmed this finding.  
In Indonesia, studies about equity market 
timing have various results.  Sulistyowati, (2012), 
Setyawan (2008), and Givari, (2007) confirmed 
the theory of EMT. It means MTB has a negative 
correlation toward the capital structure. Taurisinia 
(2013) found different results. The author found 
MTB had positive and significant influences on 
the corporate modal structures. Hildanengsih 
(2004) showed that companies in Indonesia did 
not follow the MET theory when it came to 
financing. The companies did not pay attention to 
the security and the plan. They did not take high-
value MTB to issue new shares.  Studies about 
EMT were inconsistent. Most described studies 
only explained the EMT influence on the capital 
structure but they did not explain the moderating 
effect of the board of director structures toward 
the capital structures. This addition, the 
moderating effect of the board of directors 
structure is interesting to investigate.   
The structures of the board of directors 
have important implications to determine the 
capital structure decision. It is the main organ of 
authorized and responsible incorporation to 
manage the corporation for the sake of the 
company and the external and internal corporate 
representatives Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Kochar & David, 1996; Maung, 1997). Based on 
state company law, Indonesia has two-tier board 
structures. They are the supervisory board and the 
management board.  The management board 
manages the corporate daily management led by a 
managing director. The director is responsible to 
the shareholder and the supervisory board. The 
supervisory board is led by President 
Commissioner, on behalf of the shareholders. He 
acts as the managerial supervisor. 
Helland & Sykuta (2004; 2005) and 
Weisbach (1988) explain that the supervisory 
board supervises, guides, penalizes, rewards, and 
makes critical decisions. The supervisory board 
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could employ or stop a manager. The board can 
take the consultative role by making corporate 
business strategies. The members of the 
supervisory board can recognize the mispricing 
situation and use it to receive low capital costs 
when the share value is very high.  
Based on the arguments, the supervisory 
board structure could strengthen or weaken the 
equity market timing because the board is the 
main managerial action monitor. It has the main 
role to check the managerial decision and 
determine the capital structure decision whether 
the company will take the loan or issue the equity. 
In this case, the management refers to the 
management board and its ranks. The 
management board is responsible to the 
shareholders and the supervisory board. The 
decision made by the director will not run 
properly if the corporate supervisory board does 
not grant it. 
The structure of the board direction is 
grouped into three. The first group is the 
supervisory board that refers to the number of 
commissioners in a company. The supervisory 
board composition moderates the negative 
impacts of capital structure and the MTB 
correlation toward the capital structure. Anderson 
et al, cited in Abor & Abor (2019) found lower 
debt cost at the larger supervisory board because 
the creditors perceived this company as an 
effective financial monitor. Thus, the size of the 
supervisory board reflects excellent corporate 
governance. Wen, Rwegasira & Bilderbeek (2002) 
explain that a larger size of the supervisory board 
could increase the corporate debt because the 
company has excellent monitoring. With excellent 
corporate governance, reflected on the size of the 
corporate supervisory board, it could weaken the 
negative effect of EMT on the corporate capital 
structure.  
Second, the independent supervisory board 
is a part of a portion of non-executive 
(independent) commissioners in a company. The 
presence of an independent supervisory board 
could improve the board's effectiveness to 
promote managerial monitoring and controlling 
as the representatives of the shareholders (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988; Gunasekarage & 
Reed, 2008).  The independent commissioners 
have stronger incentives to monitor and control 
the opportunistic behaviors of managers and to 
improve the reputation and the corporate images 
in the labor market with lower debt to protect 
themselves from bankruptcy risk (Borokhovich, 
Brunarski, & Harman, 2005). Thus, a higher 
proportion of independent supervisory boards 
weakens the negative effect of EMT on the capital 
structure. It is because the company could easily 
receive external funding via debt.  
 Third, the audit board is an established 
committee that is responsible to the supervisory 
board. It also assists the execution of the 
supervisory board's tasks and functions. 
Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, (2006); Kajol 
&Sunday, (2008) argue that an audit committee 
with a larger size seems effective to monitor and 
control opportunistic managerial behaviors, by 
reducing the cash flow via the use of large-scale 
debt. Moreover, the committee is usually skillful 
and experienced. Thus, there is an interaction 
between the audit committee and the equity 
market timing. The interaction could weaken the 
negative effect of EMT and the corporate capital 
structures.  
This research has three contributions to the 
existing literature works. The first one, the general 
one, is for the previous studies that explain the 
effect of EMT toward the capital structures 
without further explanations on the moderating 
effect of the board of director structures toward 
the capital structures. The second contribution is 
to enrich the EMT studies about capital structures 
in Indonesia that cause controversies. Third, it 
deals with the absence of reasonable agreement 
about corporate capital structure selection.  
Therefore, this addition, the moderating effect of 
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the board of directory structure, is interesting to 
investigate. Besides that, this research measured 
profitability, tangibility, and corporate size as the 
variables that control the correlation between the 
independent and the dependent variables without 
external influential factors. Based on the 
explanation, the researchers are interested to 
review the MTB effects on the capital structure as 
the equity market timing measurement, 
moderated by the corporate board directions, 
listed in IDX. 
From the explained problems, this research 
examined the EMT effect, measured with MTB 
toward the capital modal structures, moderated by 
the direction board structures. The capital 
structure in this research used the book leverage 
variable. On the other hand, the structures of the 
direction board used three measurements. They 
were the supervisory board, the proportion of the 
independent direction board, and the audit 
committee board.  
This research aims to analyze and examine 
the MTB effects toward the capital structure as 
the measurement of equity market timing, 
moderated by the structures of the direction 




This basic research used design to develop the 
previous promoted researches. Theoretically, this 
research used a quantitative approach that 
covered the quantitative data to prove a theory. 
The applied data type was secondary data. 
The secondary data were obtained from the IDX 
publications, in the form of manufacturing 
corporate annual reports, listed in IDX, from 
2013-2018.  The researcher used the obtained data 
from IDX www.idx.co.id.  
There were 80 companies as the research 
samples. The dependent variable: book leverage ratio 
The independent variable: market to book ratio 
The moderating variable: the size of the 
supervisory board, the proportion of the 
independent supervisory board, and the size of 
the audit committee. 
The control variables: profitability, tangibility, and 
corporate size. 
The researchers took the sample with the 
purposive sampling technique. This method is a 
selecting method with specific criteria. They are 
1. Companies listed in IDX 
2. Companies from the period of 2013 until 
2018  
3. Companies that already published their 
annual report, ended on December 31. 
4. Companies with rupiah currency used in 
their reports 
5. Companies with the detailed information 
required for this study 
The researchers analyzed the data with pooled 
method or panel data. It had the purpose to find out 
the influence of dependent variables directly with 
a regression equation model of dependent 
variable. There are two model used in this 
research as follow:  
 
Model 1:  
CAPSTRUCi,t = β0+β1MTBi,t-1+ β3MTBi,t-1*BSi,t-1+ 
β4ROAi,t-1 + β5TANGi,t-1  + β6SIZEi,t-1 + εi,t 
Model 2:  
CAPSTRUCi,t = β0+β1MTBi,t-1+ β3MTBi,t-1* BIi,t-1 
1+ β4ROAi,t-1 + β5TANGi,t-1  + β6SIZEi,t-1 + εi,t 
Model 3: 
CAPSTRUCi,t = β0+β1MTBi,t-1+ β3MTBi,t-1* 
ADTi,t-1 1+ β4ROAi,t-1 + β5TANGi,t-1  + β6SIZEi,t-1 
+ εi,t 
In which : 
CAPSTRUC: The capital structures of company 
(i) year (t) 
MTB : Market to Book Ratio  of company (i) in a 
period of (t-1) 
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BI : the size of corporate board (i) year (t-1)   
BI : the independent corporate director (i) 
year (t-1) 
ADT : The corporate audit committee (i) year 
(t-1) 
ROA : The corporate profitability (i) period (t-
1) 
TANG : The corporate tangibility (i) period (t-1)   
SIZE : the corporate size (i) period (t-1) 
 
The following applied method was the 
inferential statistic method to examine the 
hypotheses. The analysis stages before the linear 
regression test were descriptive, normality, 
heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation tests. 
The operational definitions describe the 
applied variable measurements in this research to 
avoid ambiguity. Here are the definitions of the 
variables. 
 
1. The Dependent Variable:  
The capital structure refers to a proportion or 
comparison in determining the corporate 
necessity fulfillment (Ratih, 2019). The capital 
structures are measured with book leverage ratio   
with this formula: 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐶𝑖,𝑡      =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡  
 
2. The Independent Variable: 
The equity market timing refers to a corporate 
practice to separate issuing the shares when the 
market value is high and to re-purchase the share 
when the market value is low, done by the 
company in the year (t-1) (Baker & Wurgler, 
2002). The equity market timing is measured by 
MTB with this formula: 
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
=




3. The Moderating Variable : 
1. Board size refers to the numbers of the 
supervisory board in a company (Kaymak 
& Bektas, 2008; Perrini et al., 2008 cited in 
Tarus & Ayabei, 2015). The formula of 
board size is: 
BSi,t-1 = ∑ supervisory board𝑖,𝑡−1  
 
2. Board independence refers to a proportion or 
ratio of non-executive supervisory board 
or the independence in a company. It also 
refers to the percentage of the members 
of independent commissioners toward 
the numbers of the supervisory board 
members (Morellec, Nikolov, & Urhoff, 
2012). The formula of board 
independence measurement is: 
BIi,t-1=  
 ∑ independen
∑ 𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑,𝑡−1 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑,𝑡−1
 
 
3. The audit committee refers to the established 
committee to assist the tasks and 
functions of the supervisory board. It is 
also responsible to the supervisory board 
Tarus & Ayabei, 2015 The applied 
formula is:  
ADTi,t-1 = ∑ Komite audit𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
4. The Control Variable  
1. ROA refers to the corporate capacity or 
capability to use the assets, including the 
corporate shareholders to earn a profit 





2. Tangibility refers to the asset capability as 
the guarantee to ensure the current 
liabilities (Farooq, 2015). Here is the 
tangibility notation:  




3. The corporate size refers to the 
benchmark of corporate size by observing 
the corporate total asset (Riyanto, 2010). 
The corporate size notation is: 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 = Ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡)𝑖,𝑡−1 
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RESULTS 
 
The multiple linear regression analysis 
results are from the Statistical Package for Social 
Science (SPSS) to find out the MTB effects toward 
the capital structure variable, moderated by the 
structures of manufacturing corporate board 
direction, listed in IDX, from 2013 until 2018. 
Here are the multiple linear regression results. 
Results of model 1 are shown in Table 1 and 
regression results for model 2 is depicted in Table 
2, and regression results of model 3 are shown in 
Table 3. 
Table 1 shows the following regression 
model equation:  
CAPSTRUCi,t=0,104-0,055 MTB + 0,031 
MTB*BS - 0,723 ROA - 0,032 TANG + 0,014 
SIZE + εi,t 
 
The regression result shows that the 
Market to Book Ratio (MTB) and Return on Asset 
(ROA) have negative and significant results 
toward the capital structure, the book leverage. 
The corporate size, as the moderator (MTB*BS), 













       Significance on levels *1%,**5%, ***10% 
       Source: The processed data 
 
 
capital structure (book leverage). On the other 
hand, the tangibility (TANG) and the corporate 
size (SIZE) do not have a significant correlation 
toward the capital structure (book leverage). 
The constant value is 0.104, showing that 
if the independent variable is assumed constant, 
the capital structure (book leverage) increase by 
10.4%. The R-square value or the estimated 
coefficient is 0.243, showing the market to book ratio, 
the size of the supervisory board, the profitability, 
the tangibility, and the corporate size could 
explain the book leverage as the dependent variable 
with a percentage of 24.3%. On the other hand, 
the other percentage, 75.7%, was from variables 
outside of the model.  
 The regression result shows the F value 
16.275 with a significant level is 0.000. It shows 
that simultaneously, the variables MTB, the size of 
the board (BS), as the moderating variable, and the 
profitability, tangibility, and corporate size as the 
control variables significantly influence the capital 
systolic-Blood Pressure Variable (book leverage). 
thus, the model is averagely excellent to predict 















Model Coefficient t Sig. 
Constant 0,104 0,432 0,666 
MTB -0,055 -3,412*** 0,001 
MTB*BS 0,031 1,910* 0,057 
ROA -0,723 -5,984*** 0,000 
TANG -0,032 -0,617 0,537 
SIZE 0,014 1,618 0,107 
R 0,493   
R square 0,243   
Adjusted R2 0,228   
F 16,275   
Sig. F 0,000   
Table 1.  The Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Results of Model 1  
 













                     
Significance on levels *1%,**5%, ***10% 
     Source: The processed data 
 
Table 2 shows the following regression model 
equation:  
CAPSTRUCi,t=0,153-0,097 MTB + 0,076 
MTB*BI - 0,695 ROA - 0,027 TANG + 0,011 
SIZE + εi,t 
 
The regression result of model 2 shows 
that the Market to Book Ratio (MTB) and Return on 
Asset (ROA) have negative and significant results 
toward the capital structure, the book leverage. 
The corporate size as the moderating variable 
(MTB*BI) and SIZE has a positive and significant 
correlation toward the capital structure (book 
leverage). On the other hand, the tangibility 
(TANG) does not have a significant correlation 
toward the capital structure (book leverage).  
The constant value is 0.153, showing that 
if the independent variable is assumed constant, 
the capital structure (book leverage) increase by 














coefficient is 0.253, showing the market to book ratio, 
the size of the supervisory board, the profitability, 
the tangibility, and the corporate size could 
explain the book leverage as the dependent variable 
with a percentage of 25.3%. On the other hand, 
the other percentage, 74.7%, was from variables 
outside of the model.  
 The regression result shows the F value 
17.145 with a significant level is 0.000. It shows 
that simultaneously, the MTB, the proportion of 
the independent supervisory board (BI), as the 
moderating variables, and the profitability, 
tangibility, and corporate size, as the control 
variables, influence significantly the capital 
structures (book leverage). Thus, the model is 
averagely excellent to predict the capital structure 
(book leverage). 
 The next results of linear regression is 
calculated based on model 3 which sre shown in 







Model Coefficient t Sig. 
Constant 0,153 0,804 0,422 
MTB -0,097 -3,951*** 0,000 
MTB*BI 0,076 2,802*** 0,005 
ROA -0,695 -5,757*** 0,000 
TANG -0,027 -0,545 0,586 
SIZE 0,011 1,716* 0,087 
R 0,503   
R square 0,253   
Adjusted R2 0,238   
F 17,145   
Sig. F 0,000   
Table 2.  The Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Results of Model 2  
 










Significance on levels *1%,**5%, ***10% 
     Source: The processed data 
 
Table 3 shows the following regression model 
equation:  
CAPSTRUCi,t=0,263 - 0,060MTB + 0,033 
MTB*ADT - 0,770 ROA - 0,017 TANG + 0,008 
SIZE + εi,t 
 
The regression result shows MTB and 
Return on Asset negatively and significantly 
influence the capital structure (book leverage). 
The corporate size as the moderating variable 
(MTB*ADT) has a positive and significant 
correlation toward the capital structures (book 
leverage). On the other hand, the tangibility 
(TANG) and the corporate size (SIZE) do not 
have a significant correlation toward the capital 
structure (book leverage).  
The constant value is 0.263, showing that 
if the independent variable is assumed constant, 
the capital structure (book leverage) increases by 
26.3%. The R-square value or the estimated 
coefficient is 0.243, showing the market to book ratio, 
the size of the supervisory board, the profitability, 
the tangibility, and the corporate size could 
explain the book leverage as the dependent variable 









the other percentage, 75.7%, was from variables 
outside of the model.  
 The regression result shows the F value 
16.279 with a significant level is 0.000. It shows 
that simultaneously, the MTB, the audit 
committee (ADT), as the moderating variables, 
and the profitability, tangibility, and corporate 
size, as the control variables, influence 
significantly the capital structures (book leverage). 
Thus, the model is averagely excellent to predict 
the capital structure (book leverage). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Based on the regression results of Model 1, 2, and 
3, the MTB significantly and negatively influenced 
the corporate capital structure (book leverage 
ratio). The corporate capital structure is the 
summation of the corporate efforts to adjust 
EMT during the previous period. Based on the 
EMT theory, companies will issue equity when 
the market value is high and purchase equity when 
the market value is low Baker & Wurgler, (2002) 
with the market to book ratio as the indicator of 
equity market timing.  The results showed that MTB  
Model Coefficient t Sig. 
Constant 0,263 1,415 0,158 
MTB -0,060 -3,514*** 0,001 
MTB*ADT 0,033 2,055** 0,041 
ROA -0,770 -6,256*** 0,000 
TANG -0,017 -0,330 0,742 
SIZE 0,008 1,244 0,214 
R 0,493   
R square 0,243   
Adjusted R2 0,228   
F 16,279   
Sig. F 0,000   
Table 3.  The Multiple Linear Regression Analysis Results of Model 3  
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negatively correlated toward the corporate capital 
structures in which the companies would issue the 
equity when the share values were relatively higher 
than the book value that had lower leverage. The 
EMT practice is a behavior that uses the temporal 
fluctuation paid by the equity. One of the 
consequences is the optimization of the 
shareholders' wealth by forfeiting the new 
shareholders (Jairo, 2006).   
This finding is in line with Indonesia's 
market that is inefficient with a weak form. This 
inefficient capital market situation encourages the 
equity market timing theory implementation in 
the capital structure. Worthington & Higgs, 
(2005) also confirmed this result. They 
investigated the weak-market efficiency in Asian 
Stock Exchange. They checked the daily return of 
the Asia Stock Exchange, including Indonesia, 
with random walk and series of correlation 
coefficients and running tests. The tests showed 
that the Asia Stock Exchange market, including 
Indonesia, was weak and inefficient. 
In Indonesia Stock Exchange, companies 
could apply an equity market timing strategy in their 
funding policy because they frequently had 
mispricing. It refers to the differences between 
the market value and the corporate book value 
(Yunita, Indiastuti, Ariawati & Febrian, 2018). It 
was observable from the motion of the Market to 
Book Ratio average of the manufacturing 
companies in 2018. It showed that mispricing of 
most MTB was higher than 1. Besides that, 
companies issued the shares by following the 
increase of market to book value of the previous 
period. Some companies used this situation to 
apply the EMT strategy to determine the funding 
policy (Yunita et al, 2018). 
Model 1, 2, and 3 showed the profitability 
of the corporate ROA negatively and significantly 
influenced the corporate capital structures. It was 
observable from the regression results with less 
than 1% significant level. Therefore, higher 
corporate profitability led to lower corporate 
debt. High-earning corporations used their 
internal resources instead of external resources. 
Pecking order theory also proved that higher-earning 
corporations and more liquid corporations had 
lower debt than corporations with low earning 
and lower liquid sources Sheikh & Wang, (2012). 
Model 1, 2, and 3 showed the tangibility 
differences did not influence significantly the 
corporate capital structures. It was observable 
from the regression result with a higher 
percentage than 10% of the significant level. 
Therefore, the size of asset tangibility did not 
influence the high and low debt. This research 
confirmed the trade-off theory. It proved that higher 
corporate assets made companies easier to run up 
for improving their structures of partnership 
capital with the fixed asset as the guarantee. It was 
not significant due to some types of the applied 
assets as the corporate guarantees. Jennifer and 
Philip (2015) explain that properly, such as 
machines and other unused tools, can be the 
guarantee so it will not influence the corporate 
debt ratio. Machine and tools are specific 
instruments and designed for specific purposes. It 
makes those assets cannot be sold easily or used 
as a guarantee for debt. They also cannot lower 
the debt cost so that they do not influence the 
debt ratio.  
In model 1, the moderating effect of the 
supervisory board size on the impact of MTB 
toward the capital structures showed weak and 
negative influences toward the corporate capital 
structures. It was because the interaction result of 
MTB*BI showed an insignificant level, lesser than 
a percentage of 10%. The greater size of the board 
led to more effective monitoring and control of 
cash flow management procedures while using it. 
Jensen (1986) Also argue that the supervisory 
board becomes one of the corporate monitoring 
functions. The control function by the 
supervisory board has practical forms of the 
agency theory. The supervisory board provides 
the main internal mechanism to manage the 
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monitoring function and manage the 
opportunistic behaviors of the clients in a 
company. The composition of the supervisory 
board would be effective to control and manage 
the managerial behaviors in utilizing the cash 
flow.   
Abor & Abor (2009) found that lower debt 
cost for a large supervisory board size made 
creditors perceived the company effectively 
managed their financial accounting processes. 
Based on the argument, a larger supervisory board 
size led to lower debt costs. Thus, if a company 
wants to receive the external fund, the company 
must issue the debt besides the equity.  
In model 2, the moderating effect of the 
supervisory board size on the impact of MTB 
toward the capital structures showed that the 
proportion of independent supervisory boards 
weakened the negative effects of MTB toward the 
corporate capital structure. It was because the 
interaction result of MTB*BI showed an 
insignificant level than 1%. It was in line with the 
assumption that an independent supervisory 
board was the part of non-executive 
commissioners in incorporation. The 
Independent supervisory board has an important 
role in the effective monitoring process and 
making decisions of excellent corporate 
governance. Jensen (1986) and  Sunitha & Ratnam 
(2019) argued that companies dominated by 
independent commissaries had effective 
monitoring system corporate governance action 
to limit the managerial control toward the cash 
flow. With the independent commissary, 
companies would be able to protect the 
shareholders' wealth in the form of debt payment 
and dividends.   
The perspective of resource dependency theory, 
developed by Pfeffer & Slancick (1978), explains 
that independent commissary could improve the 
corporate capability to protect the companies 
from the external environment, reduce 
uncertainty, and select sources that can improve 
the corporate capability to collect funds. Based on 
the statement, companies tend to use higher debt 
levels because they had broader external networks 
and capabilities to connect the company with the 
debt capital provider. Therefore, the proportion 
of independent supervisory boards weakened the 
negative impact of MTB on the capital structures.   
In this second model, the corporate size 
(SIZE) had a positive and significant result with a 
significant level under 10%. It is in line with Abor 
& Abor (2009). They found that larger corporate 
sizes led to higher debt used in their capital 
structures. It was because large companies had 
diversified and stable cash flow. Thus, the risk was 
lower with a higher level of debt payment and a 
lower risk of bankruptcy. Therefore, those 
companies could tolerate the high debt ratio. This 
finding is in line with Klapper & Love (2004), 
Bohren & Odegaard (2003), and Larcker, 
Richardson & Tuna (2004). Larger companies had 
more resources, such as skillful managers than 
moderate and small companies. This resource 
could make them more efficient and attractive for 
lenders. It showed that large companies were 
different in terms of debt management and 
tended not to easily bankrupt. Therefore, larger 
companies had higher corporate debt levels. 
In the third model, the moderating effect of 
the audit committee on the MTB effect toward 
the capital structures showed a negative influence. 
It was because the interaction result of 
MTB*ADTI showed a significant level lower than 
5%. It is in line with the explanation that more 
members of the audit committee led to more 
accurate, reliable, and qualified financial reports 
(Detthamrong, Chancharat, & Vithessonthi, 
2017). The trustworthy information could reduce 
the uncertainty of the agents about the corporate 
prospect. Thus, it decreased the asymmetric 
information between the principals and the 
agents. If the agency conflict decreased, the 
corporate performance improved and easily 
obtained external funding with cheaper cost 
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besides issuing the equity. It was by issuing debt 
(Sewpersadh, 2019).  Therefore, if a company had 
an audit committee, it weakened the negative 
effect of equity market timing toward the capital 
structure.  
 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION  
From the discussion of study results, it can be 
concluded some points. Firstly, higher MTB made 
companies used funding from the equity because 
it was cheaper and the companies could gain more 
profits instead of issuing the equity. Thus, the 
funding via issuing debt would decrease. It 
showed the negative impact of MTB on the capital 
structures.  
Secondly, the size of the supervisory board 
and the proportion of independent supervisory 
boards weakened the negative impact of MTB on 
the capital structures. It was observable from the 
larger size of the supervisory board and the 
independent supervisory board proportion led to 
higher debt (book leverage). It made the 
companies having lower possibilities to use the 
equity or issuing the equity as funding sources. 
Therefore, it weakened the negative impact of 
MTB on the capital structures.   
In addition, the audit committee weakened 
the negative impact of MTB on the capital 
structures. It was because more members of the 
audit committee led to the more accurate, reliable, 
and qualified financial report. Thus, creditors 
would more believe and the companies could 
receive the funding via debt. 
Furthermore, profitability as control 
variable, showed a negative and significant 
influence on the capital structures. On the other 
hand, the tangibility showed no influence on the 
corporate capital structures.  
Therefore, this study recommended some 
suggestions. Companies should pay attention to 
the proportion of the external funding uses to 
receive optimal capital structure. Thus, the 
companies could use it to improve corporate 
values. Companies should be selective in 
considering the investment because it influences 
corporate funding decisions.   
Next, companies must pay attention to the 
corporate internal factors, such as the size of the 
supervisory board, the proportion of the 
independent supervisory board, and the size of 
the audit committee. It is important because the 
structures of the supervisory board could 
influence the corporate funding decision. It is 
because the supervisory board is the highest board 
to determine the funding corporate decision of 
companies.  
Future investigations should develop these 
research results by using all non-financial sector 
companies and adding the other variables that can 
directly influence the equity market timing and the 
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